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Civil Procedure
by Jack H. Friedenthal*
No one of my honest opinions, in fact, is adapted
to my popularity in Glathion, because I am a monstrous clever fellow who does justice to things as they
are.
Therefore, I must remember always, in justice to myself, that I very probably hold traffic with madmen.
Yet Rome was a fine town, and it was geese who
saved it. These people may be right; and certainly
I cannot go so far as to say they are wrong: but still,
at the same time-! Yes, that is how I feel about it.
J ames Branch Cabell, Jurgen

* A.B. 1953, Stanford University.
LL.B. Harvard Law School. Professor
of Law, Stanford University School of
Law. Member, California State Bar.

The author extends his appreciation
to Andrew G. Pearl, student at Golden
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New Trial-Specification of Grounds and Reasons
In 1965 the legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure l
section 657, which concerns the procedure for granting a new
trial. In Mercer v. Perez 2 and Treber v. Superior Court 3 the
supreme court interpreted the new provisions and attempted
to clarify them.4 Subsequently, a number of related cases
were decided in the courts of appeal. Together these cases
involve important changes in the practice regarding new trials.
The major alteration of section 657 was the addition of a
requirement that the court specify its reasons for granting a
1. All further statutory references,
unless otherwise specified, are to Cal.
Code of Civ. Pro.
2.68 Cal.2d 104,65 Cal. Rptr. 315,
436 P.2d 315 (1968).
3. 68 C i1.2d J 28, 65 Cal. Rptr. 330.
436 P.2d 330 (1968),
4. The amended provisions of CCP
657 read as follows:
"When a new trial is granted, on all
or part of the issues. the court shall
specify the ground or grounds upon
which it is granted and the court's
reason or reasons for granting the new
trial upon each ground stated,
"A new trial shall not be granted
upon the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, /lor UpOII the grou/ld of excessil'e or illadequate damages, unless
after weighing the evidence the court
is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom,
that the court or jury clearly should
have reached a different verdict or decision.
"The order passing upon and determining the motion must be made and
entered as provided in Section 660 and
if the motion is granted must state the
ground or grounds relied upon by the
court, and may contain the specification of reasons, If an order granting
such motion does not contain such
specification of reasons, the court must,
192
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within 10 days after filing such order,
prepare, sign and file such specification
of reasons in writing with the clerk,
The court shall not direct the attorney
for a party to prepare either or both
said order and said specification of
reasons,
"On appeal from an order granting a
new trial the order shall be affirmed if
it should have been granted upon any
ground stated in the motion, whether
or not specified in the order or specification of reasons ':' * *, except that
(a) the order shall not be affirmed upon
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or UpOII the ground of excessil'e or illadequate damages, unless
such ground is stated in the order
granting the motion * * ':' and (b)
on appeal from an order granting a
new trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or upon
the ground of excessive * * * or
inadequate damages. it shall be conclusively presumed that said order as to
such ground was made only for the
reasons specified in said order or said
specification of reasons, and such order
shall be reversed as to such ground
only if there is no substantial basis in
the record for any such reasons."
(As amended Cal. Stats, 1965, ch, 1749,
§ 1: Cal. Stats, 1967, ch. 72, § 1.)

2
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new trial. This raised the primary question: What are sufficient specifications within the meaning of the statute? In
pursuing this inquiry, it is necessary to consider what has been
held to satisfy an already existing requirement, that of specifying the grounds on which a new trial order is based.
The Requirement of Stating the Grounds on which the
Grant of a New Trial is Based

In 1919 section 657 was amended to add a provision requiring that whenever a trial court granted a new trial based on
the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict the
court had to specify, in its order, that ground as the one upon
which the new trial was granted. While the requirement appears to be clear, trial courts often failed to make the necessary
specifications. The statute provided further than unless such
ground was specified it would be "conclusively presumed"
that the granting of the new trial was not based on such
ground. The courts were liberal, however, in finding sufficient
specification in the language of the new trial order. If the
language was susceptible of an interpretation showing an intent
to include insufficiency of the evidence as one of the grounds,
it was generally so interpreted. Finally, in Aced v. HobbsSesack Plumbing Co. 5 the supreme court held that this liberal
position was improper; the specification must be made directly
or be directly inferable.
The Aced decision was not as harsh as it might appear. The
court expressly did not disapprove those decisions upholding
specifications in the following situations: when the trial court
said no more than that it based its decision on "all the grounds
stated in the motion," and insufficiency was one of the grounds
stated; when no specification was made, but the moving party
put only the ground of insufficiency of the evidence in his
motion; or when the court could directly infer from the language of the motion that the ground was insufficiency of the
evidence (for example, when held to be based on the inadequacy of damages). In 1966, five years after Aced, the
5. 55 Cal.2d 573, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257,
360 P.2d 897 (1961).
13
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court, faced with another apparently inadequate order for new
trial, held that the specification of grounds would be inadequate only when no legitimate direct inference is possible. 6
The 1965 amendment to section 657 continues the requirement that the grounds be specified, but extends it to all grounds
upon which the motion is granted. 7 In Mercer v. Perel the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial was granted after a jury
verdict had been rendered for defendants:
"The motion for a new trial is granted. The court is of
the definite opinion, after analyzing the evidence in this
case, that there has been a definite miscarriage of justice.
The court is of the opinion that the jury trying this case
should have rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs and
against the defendants."9
On appeal from the judgment defendants claimed that the
order failed to specify the grounds for the decision. Citing
Malkasian v. Irwin 10 and lee-Kist Packing Co. v. 1. F. Sloan
CO .. ,l1 the court held that, since the motion itself was predicated solely upon insufficiency of the evidence and since the
motion could be granted only upon a ground alleged in the
motion, an inference satisfying the specification requirement
could be drawn that the insufficiency of the evidence was the
ground upon which the court had acted.
The Requirement of Specifying the Reasons for Granting
a New Trial on the Grounds Stated
Defendants in Mercer also claimed that the new requirement of the specification of reasons for the grant of a new
trial had not been complied with. This claim raised the
questions of how far the court would go in inferring the
6. Frantz v. McLaughlin, 64 Cal.2d
622, 51 Cal. Rptr. 282, 414 P.2d 410
(1966). But cf. Malkasian v. Irwin, 61
Cal.2d 738, 40 Cal. Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d
822 (1964).
7. As amended Cal. Stats. 1965, ch.
1749, § 1; Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 72, § 1.
See footnote 4, page 192.
194
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8. 68 Cal.2d 104, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315,
436 P.2d 315 (1968).
9. 68 Cal.2d at 108, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 317, 436 P.2d at 317.
10. 61 Cal.2d 738, 40 Cal. Rptr. 78,
394 P.2d 822 (1964).
11. 157 Cal. App.2d 695, 321 P.2d
840 (1958).
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reasons for the grant of a new trial and would it take the
same approach it had taken on specification of grounds. 12
The court pointed out that there are two reasons for the new
provision. The first is to require trial judges, rarely overruled
when they grant new trials, to reflect seriously before making
their decisions. The second is to assist the appellate court
in reviewing the propriety of the grant of a new trial, particularly when based on the insufficiency of evidence. Prior
to the amendment, an appellant challenging the grant of a
new trial was required to show that the whole record did not
justify a new trial. A court of appeal was usually put in the
position of searching the entire record for evidence upon
which it could justify the decision below. If it found such
evidence it would have to uphold the grant of the new trial,
though it might be relying on evidentiary matters the trial
court had not relied on and, indeed, had not found sufficient
to warrant a new trial. The appellate court could not devote
its attention, as it should, to those items upon which the
trial court had based its decision.
In effectuating the purposes of the new provision, the
supreme court in Mercer took what may be considered a
"hard line," stating that it would not infer from the record
the reasons for the decision. Plaintiff, the respondent, argued
that since defendants pleaded no affirmative defenses, the only
issues decided by the jury were that the defendants were
negligent and that their negligence was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries. Since those were the only issues, he
contended, it must be inferred that the lower court reasoned
that the evidence showed defendants to be negligent and that
their negligence W$lS the proximate cause of the injuries. In
refusing to accept this argument, the court cited the Aced
case and proposed that, since Aced had disapproved of a similar inference with regard to the specification of grounds, it
12. It should be made clear that at
this point we are dealing primarily with
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence and the reasons therefor. Insufficiency is the only ground which if
not stated results in a presumption that
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it is not the ground relied on. Furthermore, with respect to such ground, it
is presumed that the only reasons relied
upon are those specified in the order.
See last paragraph CCP § 657.
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was "not disposed to adopt a contrary rule with respect to
the reasons for those grounds."13 There is no question that
the court was taking a "harder line" with reasons than it
had with grounds, considering the limitations and concessions
in the Aced decision. 14 In light of the purposes of the new
provision, the decision to take a "harder line" regarding reasons seems appropriate. It is possible that the trial judge
based his decision on a reason totally outside those which
plaintiff claimed were the only ones that could be inferred.
Thus, the trial court may have been totally incorrect in granting a new trial; the assumption that the judge must have made
a decision on appropriate reasons is not warranted. 15
After deciding that direct specification is required, the court
had to determine just how detailed the specification must be.
It attempted to lay down standards in the following language:
No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the content
of such a specification, and it will necessarily vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case. For
example, if the ground is "irregularity in the proceedings"
caused by counsel's referring to insurance, the judge
should state that the reason for his ruling was the misconduct of counsel in making such reference; if the ground
is "misconduct of the jury" through their resorting to
chance, the judge should specify this improper method
of deliberation as the basis of his action; if the ground
is that the decision is "against the law" because of a
failure to find on a material issue, the judge should so
state and should identify that issue. And to give full
effect to the new scope of review provided in the fourth
paragraph of the 1965 amendments, discussed hereinabove, we hold that if the ground relied upon is "insufficiency of the evidence" the judge must briefly recite the
respects in which he finds the evidence to be legally
13. 68 Cal.2d at 117, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 323, 436 P.2d at 323.
14. Indeed, the decision in Mercer
itself, holding the ground but not the
reasons to be sufficiently specified,
illustrates this point.
196
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15. Of course, neither is the assumption made in the Mercer case as to
grounds warranted; it is possible the
judge erroneously went off on an error
of law not mentioned in the motion.
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inadequate; no other construction is consonant with the
conclusive presumption on appeal that the order was
such an
made "only for the reasons specified"
order must briefly identify the portion of the record which
convinces the judge "that the court or jury clearly should
have reached a different verdict or decision."16 (Emphasis added.)
That this language did not solve all interpretation problems
may be inferred from the number of cases arising in the courts
of appeal attempting to ascertain the sufficiency of the trial
court's specification of reasons. The element of the Mercer
opinion causing difficulty was the requirement that the court
"briefly identify the portion of the record" showing that the
evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict. In Kincaid v.
Sears Roebuck & CO.17 the court of appeal held that the
language of Mercer did not require the trial judge to "cite
page and line of the record, or discuss the testimony of particular witnesses, but instead he need only point out the particular 'deficiency' of the prevailing parties' case which convinces
him the judgment should not stand. This accomplishes the
purpose of the statute by enabling a reviewing court to 'determine if there is a substantial basis for finding such a deficiency.' "18 Funderburk v. General Telephone CO. 19 and Matlock v. Farmers Mercantile Co. 20 contain similar language.
These cases further held that if the trial judge states his reasons
for granting a new trial in terms of ultimate facts, he satisfies
the requirements of the statute. Thus, if he states that the evidence is insufficient to justify a finding of negligence, insufficient to justify a finding of damages, or insufficient to permit
a finding of contributory negligence, he satisfies the requirements of the statute. 1
16.
Rptr.
17.
Rptr.

68 Cal.2d at 115-116, 65 Cal.
at 322, 436 P.2d at 322.
259 Cal. App.2d 733, 66 Cal.
915 (1968).

18. 259 Cal. App.2d 733 at 738, 66
Cal. Rptr. 915 at 918 (1968).
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19. 262 Cal. App.2d 869.
Rptr. 275 (1968).
20. 258 Cal. App.2d 362.
Rptr. 723 (1968).
1. Actually the opinion in
went even further, stating that
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This standard for specificity seems clearly correct. It
serves the purposes for which the requirement of specification of reasons was put into the code. If a new trial is
granted on the basis of lack of evidence to support a material
point, it is impossible to designate where the record shows lack
of evidence. Even if the new trial is based on the weight of the
evidence showing the existence of a material point obviously
not accepted by the jury, it is extremely difficult to point to
each item in the record bearing on the issue and to discuss
its particular impact on the trial court's decision. As the court
in Kincaid stated, "It would be unreasonable to infer a statutory intent that the court's stated reasons embrace a discussion of the weight to be given, and the inferences to be drawn
from each item of evidence supporting, or impeaching, the
judgment."2 When a new trial is granted on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the court of
appeal has to peruse the entire record for evidence (or the
lack thereof) regarding the particular fact in question.
In McLaughlin v. City and County of San Francisco, 3
plaintiff, a passenger on a cable car, was injured when the
car stopped suddenly. Defendant admitted liability and the
case was tried solely on the issue of damages. After a jury
verdict for $8,117.50, the trial court granted a new trial
conditioned upon plaintiff's refusal to accept a remittitur.
The order read as follows:
This order granting a New Trial is based upon the
failure of the Plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence reasonable total damages, both general and
special above the said amount of Five Thousand One
Hundred and Seventeen Dollars and Fifty Cents ($5,117.50) . It is further ordered that if such waiver is filed
then said Motion of a New Trial shall stand Denied;

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/10

be sufficient for the trial court simply
to specify that "the defendant was not
negligent" or "the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries."
198
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2. 259 Cal. App.2d at 739, 66 Cal.
Rptr. at 919.
3. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
782 (1968).
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otherwise said Motion shall stand granted upon the
ground hereinabove stated. 4 (Emphasis added.)
Although the appellate court in McLaughlin cited with approval Matlock, Kincaid and Funderburk, it nevertheless held
that the specification of reasons was inadequate. The court
took the position that the trial court should have done more
to show which items of special and general damages were
involved in its determination. The court believed it was
somehow improper that, damages being the only issue involved, both the grounds and the reasons given for the decision
were the same. It failed to recognize that under the Aced
and Mercer cases it is clear that the grounds may be inferred
from the reasons when there is only one issue at stake. Clearly,
the reasons in this case were appropriately stated, and the
grounds, it would seem, could justifiably be inferred. While
the trial judge could be required to state just what items
of special damages he thought improper and the extent of
general damages which he thought possible, such a requirement seems unnecessarily restrictive and burdensome. It is
obvious that the supreme court will have to augment its
opinion in Mercer so that trial judges will know precisely
what their duties are. s
The Effect of Failure to Specify Reasons

The most controversial part of the Mercer opinion is the
decision as to what happens when the specification is inadequate. The problem is complex and can be understood only
after a thorough reading of the last paragraph of section 657. 6
This paragraph makes it clear that the grant of a new trial
will not be sustained on appeal on the ground of insufficiency
of the evidence unless such ground is stated and that it will
be conclusively presumed that the only reasons for granting
the new trial on that ground are those reasons stated in the
order. It follows then: If no reasons are stated in the order,
4. 264 Cal. App.2d at - , 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 783.
5. It is interesting to note that the
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supreme court denied hearings in both
Kincaid and Matlock.
6. The statute is set out on page
192, at footnote 4.
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the new trial cannot be sustained on the insufficiency of the
evidence. The question becomes, when no reasons are found,
should the appellate court reinstate the original verdict or send
the case back to the trial judge and permit him to insert his
reasons for granting the new trial?
In the next to last paragraph of section 657 it is stated,
"[I]f an order granting such motion does not contain such
specification of reasons, the court must, within 10 days after
filing such order, prepare, sign and file such specification of
reasons in writing with the clerk. The court shall not direct
the attorney for a party to prepare either or both said order
and said specification of reasons." The supreme court in
Mercer interpreted these words to provide an absolute 1O-day
limit on the power of the trial judge to specify his reasons,
thus, as a practical matter, making it impossible for him to
do so after an appeal. After 10 days have run, said the
supreme court, the trial court has no jurisdiction to specify
reasons.
The history of section 657 gives strong support to the
supreme court's conclusion. Prior to the 1965 amendments
the statute provided that any required specification of grounds
had to be made within 10 days after granting the order; failure
to do so resulted in a conclusive presumption that the order
was not based on such ground. Under this provision it was
held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to make such
a specification once 10 days had elapsed. 7 By imposing a
10-day limitation regarding the specification of reasons with
language similar to the prior requirement for specifying
grounds, the 1965 amendment clearly indicates that the legislature intended the new provision to be interpreted in the
same way as the old one. Furthermore, as the court in
Mercer pointed out, the policy of the 1965 amendments would
be thwarted if the appellate court could order the case to
be returned for the trial judge to add a few words to his original order. The trial court would not be disposed to take

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/10

7. Frantz v. McLaughlin, 64 Cal.2d
622, 51 Cal. Rptr. 282, 414 P.2d 410
(1966).
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the same requisite care to make certain that it has specified
its reasons as it would when failure to do so renders its grant
of a new trial void. Moreover, a successful moving party,
not wanting to lose a new trial, is given incentive to urge
the judge to comply with the statute. Finally, the Mercer
decision avoids the double appeal that would occur if, in every
situation where specifications are improper, the case is remanded to the trial court for a statement of reasons, then
returned to the appellate court for a decision on the merits
of the new trial grant.
The problem with the Mercer ruling is that a litigant who
has obtained a new trial is at the mercy of a trial judge who
fails in his duty to make the proper specifications. The reversal of a new trial order is a serious price to pay for procedural regulation when the reversal causes the initial judgment
to stand, no matter how inadequate or unfair, and when the
successful moving party is helpless to make the trial judge
do his proper job.
The problem is particularly acute in those cases decided
by the trial judge before the Mercer opinion was written. In
light of the liberal attitude the court had previously taken
with respect to the specification of grounds, many trial judges
and litigants may be caught unaware. The courts might
ameliorate this situation by following the analogy of the Aced
decision, which held that stringent rules regarding grounds
should be applied prospectively. In Aced the court said,
"While it is true that ordinarily an overruling decision is
deemed to state what the law was from the beginning and is
therefore generally given retroactive effect, an exception has
been applied in several instances with respect to procedural
matters."8 Even though the specification of grounds in that
case was clearly inadequate, the court upheld it to avoid unfairness to the party for whom the new trial had been granted.
The courts in the current cases involving the 1965 amendments
to section 657 could be similarly lenient in determining what
is a sufficient specification of reasons, and thus avoid the
8. 55 Ca1.2d at 580, 12 Cal. Rptr. at
260, 360 P.2d at 900.
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drastic effect of the ten-day rule, at least in those cases decided
by the trial court prior to the Mercer decision.
Until now, most cases have given a sufficiently broad interpretation of the requirement of specification of reasons
to hold the trial court's specification adequate. In those
cases in which the trial court's specification has been held
insufficient, the courts have found special means for permitting the new trial. In Mercer, for example, the court
did not have to face the ultimate consequences of a reversal
of the new trial order. Plaintiff had cross-appealed on the
ground that the trial judge had erred in giving instructions.
After reversing the order granting plaintiff a new trial, the
supreme court went on to reverse the "reinstated" judgment
on the cross-appeaP
A means of avoiding the effect of the Mercer decision,
resulting from insufficient specification, is discussed in Treber
v. Superior Court,I° a companion case to Mercer. The trial
court's order stated, "Motion for new trial granted-errors in
law."ll Petitioner, who had received a jury verdict at trial,
sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate the
new trial order because no reasons had been specified. The
supreme court denied the writ, pointing out that the first
clause of the last paragraph of section 657 reads as follows:
"On appeal from an order granting a new trial the order shall
be affirmed if it should have been granted upon any ground
stated in the motion, whether or not specified in the order or
specification of reasons . . . . "12 The Mercer case dealt with
the special exception to this rule which applies only when
insufficiency of the evidence is to be considered as a ground on
appeal and no reasons are given for granting the motion on
9. Ironically, the court gave "considerable weight" to the fact that the
trial judge, in ruling on the motion for
new trial, had stated that there had
been a definite miscarriage of justice.
10. 68 Cal.2d 128,65 Cal. Rptr. 330,
436 P.2d 330 (1968).

202
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11. 68 Cal.2d at 130, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 332, 436 P.2d at 332.
12. The "or specification of reasons"
refers to the situation where at the
time of the order no reasons are specified and within 10 days such specification of reasons of filed in a document
that makes no mention of grounds.
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that ground. 13 Therefore, even though the appellate court
must reverse a new trial granted on the basis of insufficiency
of the evidence when that ground is not specified in the order
(or directly inferable) or when the reasons for the grant on that
ground are not specified, it not only can, but must, search the
record to see whether or not the grant of a new trial should
be upheld on any other ground set forth in the motion for a
new trial. This is true even if the trial court did not mention
the ground or contemplate it as a basis for a new trial.
Thus it was held in Treber, when the trial court specified no
reasons at all, the writ of mandate was inappropriate since the
order might be valid. As the court in Treber stated, "It
follows that a failure of the trial judge to specify any groundand a fortiori any reason for a ground actually stated-cannot be held to render the order void from its inception. The
reviewing court remains under an express statutory duty to
affirm such an order if the record will support any ground
listed in the motion."14
In Byers v. Board of Supervisors I6 the trial judge granted a
motion for a new trial on two grounds: (a) that the evidence
was insufficient to justify the decision and (b) that the decision
was against the law. Finding that the reasons for the decision were filed sixteen days after the order was granted, the
court of appeal, following Treber, held that it could not uphold
the order on the ground of insufficiency, but could and did
uphold it on the ground that the decision was against the
law.
There are three cases in which the courts of appeal reversed
the grant of a new trial where the reasons were never specified
or were specified after the ten-day limit, and the only ground
that could justify a new trial was insufficiency of evidence. 16
13. The statute is set out on page
192, at footnote 4.
14. 68 Cal.2d at 134, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 334, 436 P.2d at 334.
15. 262 Cal. App.2d 148, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 549 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see McKinstry, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this
volume.
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16. Brooks v. Harootunian, 261 Cal.
App.2d 680, 68 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1968);
Higson v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
263 Cal. App.2d 333, 69 Cal. Rptr. 497
(1968); McLaughlin v. City & County
of San Francisco, 264 Cal. App.2d -,
70 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1968).
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In each case the court carefully reviewed the record to determine whether or not there was justification for upholding
the order on grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence.
Although never clearly stated, each opinion gives the impression that the appellate courts thought the original verdicts
were justified.
Specification of Reasons and the "Two-Issue Rule"

Multiple issues present another problem in interpreting
the· specification provision of section 657 when a new trial
is based on the insufficiency of the evidence. For example,
in a simple automobile accident case where negligence of the
defendant and contributory negligence are both in issue, a new
trial granted for plaintiff after a defense verdict must presumably be based on the notion that the preponderance of
the evidence showed not only that defendant was negligent
but also that plaintiff was not. It would seem to follow that
the court should specify its reasons on both of these issues. 17
In two cases, Funderburk v. General Telephone Co. IS and
Kramer v. Boynton/ 9 the trial court mentioned that the evidence was insufficient regarding only one of the basic issues,
presumably leaving it open to interpretation whether or not
the other issue justified upholding the verdict. On appeal from
an order granting a new trial, the appellant in each case argued
that since, under section 657, it is presumed conclusively
that the order is granted only for the reasons specified, the
failure to specify on all such issues was fatal. In both cases
it was held that such a technical reading of the statute was
improper, that it must be assumed the trial court knew the
law and knew it has stated reasons with respect to only one
issue. It was further assumed that the judge did not grant
a new trial frivolously and thus impliedly determined that the
evidence on other grounds was not sufficient to justify the
17. See e.g. Matlock v. Farmers Mercantile Co., 258 Cal. App.2d 362, 65
Cal. Rptr. 723 (1968).
18. 262 Cal. App.2d 869, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 275 (1968).
204
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19. 258 Cal. App.2d 171, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 669 (1968).

14

Friedenthal: Civil Procedure

Civil Procedure

verdict. The decisions tend to make sense because they prevent a trap for an unwary court which might fail to specify
every conceivable defense as having been insufficiently established, but they are difficult to justify in light of the technical interpretation of the statute given by Mercer. If the purpose is to make the trial court think through its decision carefully, it seems necessary to require the trial court to expressly
deal with every issue that could determine the case.

Conclusion
As a result of the Mercer and Treber holdings, it is incumbent upon any party who is moving for a new trial to
specify in his motion every conceivable ground upon which
the new trial may be granted. By doing so, he maximizes his
chances for upholding the order if the trial court's specifications of reasons or grounds is deemed insufficient to uphold
it on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Furthermore, the
successful moving party should urge the trial judge to comply
with the mandate of section 657 in giving his grounds and
reasons. He might also gratuitously submit a proposed set of
specifications, even though he cannot be forced to do so, since
pursuant to the statutory purpose, the court must prepare its
own. The danger of this gratuitous assistance is that the
trial judge may come to expect it and will fail to comply with
the statute in its absence.
When an appeal of a new trial order has been taken, it
behooves the appellee to cross-appeal whenever he can legitimately do so. If he does, he provides the appellate court
an opportunity to overturn an unjust decision, even though for
technical faults it is unable to uphold an otherwise appropriate
grant of a new trial motion. 20
20. When a party's motion for a new
trial has been granted on the insuffi·
ciency of the evidence and the appeal
is based on the inadequacy of the
specifications, it is not only important
for the appellee to point out to the
appellate court that the motion for new
trial included grounds other than in-
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sufficiency of the evidence, he must also
be sure to augment the record on appeal
to permit the court of appeal to see
whether or not the motion can be upheld on one of the other grounds. Thus
in Tagney v. Hoy, 260 Cal. App.2d
372, 67 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1968), where
appellee neither cross-appealed nor
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The supreme court needs to clarify the uncertainties of
the interpretation raised by the new provisions of section 657.
Indeed one might hope that the legislature will reconsider the
entire section in an effort to clarify it. Why a failure of
specification of reasons should be fatal when the ground is
insufficiency of the evidence and not when the error is of
another type is unclear. The basic policies of the new act,
to force the trial judge to reflect with care on his decision
and to assist the appellate court in determining what matters
are significant on appeal, can best be served by making the
penalties for failure to comply with the statute's requirements
identical, regardless of the particular ground and reasons upon
which the order for new trial is based.

Class Actions
In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. l the Supreme Court of
California once again attempted to define the limits of a
permissible class action. The plaintiff, suing on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, alleged that the
defendant, Yellow Cab Company, violated a contract with the
City of Los Angeles to charge rates according to amounts
fixed by the Public Utilities Commission of that city. The
specific claim was that the taxicab meters had been set to
register rates in excess of those set by the commission, so all
persons who had used the taxicabs were overcharged. 2 Plaintiff sought to recover the total amount of the overcharge for
the four years prior to the suit (the four years being the applicable statute of limitations period for written contracts).
Plaintiff further alleged that the exact amount of the overcharge was known to the defendant and could be ascertained
at trial. The trial court held that a class action was improper;
the supreme court reversed.
augmented the record, the court was
forced to reverse the order granting
the new trial.
1. 67 Cal.2d 695, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724,
433 P.2d 732 (1967).
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2. The complaint is in two courts:
the first seeking recovery on behalf of
taxicab users paying for the services
with script book coupons; the second
seeking recovery on behalf of taxicab
users paying cash for the services.
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The authority for class actions is found in section 382
of the Code of Civil Procedure, a section so broad in its terms
that it would permit a class action to be maintained in practically every instance a party so denominates his case. 3 The
California courts, while paying lip service to the statutory
requirements, have virtually rewritten them according to their
notions of what a class action should in fact accomplish.
As the court in Daar pointed out, it has been uniformly said
that two requirements must be met to sustain any class action:
( 1) There must be an ascertainable class and (2) there must
be among the parties to be represented a well defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved.
A thorough study of case law reveals that these two requirements are but one. The court in Darr recognized this:
[W]hether there is an ascertainable class depends in turn
upon the community of interest among the class members
in the questions of law and fact involved. If we conclude that the instant complaint properly sets forth a
class action, the judgment herein would be res judicata
as to all persons to whom the common questions of law
and fact pertain. We therefore proceed to examine the
complaint in order to determine whether it sets forth
a sufficient community of interests.
The court completely dispelled any notion that the plaintiff
or the court at the outset must be able to determine precisely
who are the members of the class. The court said, "If the
existence of an ascertainable class has been shown, there is
no need to identify its individual members in order to bind all
members by the judgment. The fact that the class members
3. § 382. Parties in interest, when to
be joined: When one or more may
sue or defend for the whole. Of the
parties to the action, those who are
united in interest must be joined as
plaintiffs or defendants; but if the consent of anyone who should have been
joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained,
he may be made a defendant, the rea-

son thereof being stated in the complaint; and when the question is one
of a common or general interest, of
many persons, or when the parties are
numerous, and it is impracticable to
bring them aU before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit
of aU.
CAL LAW 1969
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are unidentifiable at this point will not preclude a complete
determination of the issues affecting the c1ass.,,4
In several prior cases the courts seemed to indicate that
the failure of a class action was due to the inability to identify
in advance the members of the class with some precision. In
the often quoted case of Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of
Roses Ass'n.,5 in which a suit was brought on behalf of persons
who allegedly had been unlawfully deprived of tickets to an
athletic contest, the court said, "In the present case, there is
no ascertainable class, such as the stockholders, bondholders,
or creditors of an organization. Rather, there is only a large
number of individuals, each of whom mayor may not have,
or care to assert, a claim against the operators of the 1947
Rose Bowl Game for the alleged wrongful refusal of admission
thereto."6 The court went on to state that it could find no
case in which it "has been held that a representative or class
suit was a proper or appropriate vehicle for the determination
of alleged tort liability of defendants to numerous unnamed
and unascertained persons."7
In the Weaver case the class was defined as all those persons
who, in answering an advertisement offering tickets to the
Rose Bowl Game, had appeared at the ticket office at the
appointed time, had received a stub supposedly assuring them
of the right to purchase two tickets to the Rose Bowl Game,
and had been refused tickets and admission. There was,
of course, no record from which the court could ascertain
the exact persons to whom the stubs were given and to whom
admission was refused. In the Daar case some persons in the
class could be ascertained because they paid for their taxicab charges with script, circulated and paid for in advance by
certain taxicab users. Most class members, however, were casual users of taxicabs who paid cash. An attempt to identify
these persons would be as futile as an attempt to identify the
people standing in line in the Weaver case. The Weaver case,
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4. 67 Cal.2d at 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
732, 433 P.2d at 740.
5. 32 Cal.2d 833, 198 P.2d 514
(1948).
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however, did not turn on the inability to identify class members, but on the inability of the court to provide direct relief
that would encompass all the individuals within the defined
class. In short, there was no so-called "community of interest," which is really at the heart of the class action problem.
Much has been said about what it a proper community of
interest upon which a class action may be maintained. An
analysis of the California decisions reveals clearly that a
proper community of interest depends upon whether or not the
court can determine if a judgment against the defendant,
should he lose, would finally settle the defendant's liability,
and the amount thereof, to the class as a whole. If so, then the
fact that individual members of the class must come into the
case to prove their share of the recovery will not bar the
class action; but when no specific judgment can be rendered
for the class as a whole against the defendant, the class action
is not permitted. In the Weaver case, for example, where
it was alleged that each plaintiff was entitled to actual damages
plus the $100 penalty damages under section 53 of the Civil
Code, the court refused to permit a class action on the ground
that, under the statute, to be entitled to the $100 amount each
person would have had to prove that he was neither drunk,
disorderly nor guilty of lewd or immoral conduct; that he
was present at the box office; that he received a stub; and
that he was refused a ticket and admission to the Rose Bowl
Game. Furthermore, he would have had to prove any individual damages sought over and above the statutory penalty.
The total amount of liability the defendant would suffer in the
event of judgment for the plaintiff was unascertainable, not
only because it was unknown how many persons would come
forward, but also because their individual rights against the
defendant varied. Class actions have also been held inappropriate in similar circumstances where varying individual damages or defendant's personal defenses to individual claims
render the total amount of the liability unascertainable. 8
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762 (J 964); Most Worshipful Sons of
14

Light Grand Lodge v. Sons of Light
Lodge No.9, 118 Cal. App.2d 78, 257
P.2d 464 (1953).
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When the nature of the relief sought is equitable and involves a simple judgment against the defendant which has
nothing to do with the individual rights of the members of
the plaintiff class, the courts have had no difficulty in finding
a class action appropriate. In Heffernan v. Bennett & Armour/ a number of defendant's creditors brought a class suit
to set aside a conveyance allegedly made as a fraud upon the
creditors. The court upheld the suit, noting that it was unimportant that some known creditors might not be able to
prove their claims because of the statute of limitations or
that other creditors might be unknown. The importance was
that a judgment for all the creditors could be rendered against
the defendant regarding the particular matter at interest, the
setting aside of a fraudulent conveyance. A similar case,
City and County of San Francisco v. Market St. Ry./o held that
a group of individuals each of whom had filed a personal injury claim against a defendant corporation, could sue as a
class to enjoin that corporation from paying a liquidation
dividend to its stockholders which would have rendered any
of the plaintiffs' tort claims unenforceable.
Although more recent cases pose difficult factual questions,
the results support the hypothesis that class actions are permitted if, but only if, the court may grant complete relief
against the defendant in the actual suit before it. In Chance v.
Superior Court/I suit was brought on behalf of the owners
of 2,139 trust deeds, all representing security interests in
separate but contiguous lots situated within a single tract of
land. Suit to foreclose was brought on behalf of all the trust
deed owners against the property owner who was alleged to
have been in default on his obligations. The plaintiffs wanted
a declaration that defendant was in default to all of them;
that each deed was not a purchase money trust deed, which
could be satisfied only upon sale of the particular lot which it
represented; and that the entire land secured by the trust deed
9. 110 Cal. App.2d 564, 243 P.2d
846 (1952).
10. 95 Cal. App.2d 648, 213 P.2d
780. See also Jellen v. O'Brien, 89
Cal. App. 505, 264 P. 1115 (1928).
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notes be sold by a commissioner as a unit under defendant's
stipulation "that the land in the within tracts is more valuable
as one integral unit than if the parcels are sold individually."12
The property owner argued that there was no community of
interest among the parties because each had separately purchased his own trust deeds and would have to show that defendant was in default to him and because defendant had
separate defenses against individual plaintiffs which would
have to be litigated separately. In answering these arguments
plaintiffs relied on another stipulation by defendant that the
actions have "common questions of law and fact with all of
the deeds of trust being in default and the issues to be decided
by the Court and the defenses of the defendants being the
same for all investors in each tract.,,13 Thus it was possible in Chance, on a given set of facts as proved by the
parties, for the court to give one relief against the defendant
that would encompass the entire class.
In Fanucchi v. Coberly-West Co.,14 plaintiffs brought suit
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against
a cotton ginning company. Over a period of years the plaintiffs, who were cotton growers, delivered their cotton to defendants who separated the lint from the seed, paid each grower
for the actual amount of lint obtained, and without weighing
the seed, paid each grower for his seed a certain amount based
upon an arbitrary formula. The plaintiffs alleged that the
arbitrary formula permitted the defendants to retain part of
the proceeds from the seed delivered to them and that this
"overage" belonged to the growers. Defendants claimed that
no class action could be maintained because the rights of each
owner depended upon his individual contracts with the defendant corporation. The trial court held that a class action
was inappropriate; the appellate court reversed.
The appellate court reasoned that anyone grower would
have to establish the same facts as any other grower would
12. 58 Cal.2d at 283, 23 Cal. Rptr.
at 765, 373 P.2d at 853.
13. 58 Cal.2d at 286, 23 Cal. Rptr.
at 767, 373 P.2d at 855.
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have to establish-that the seeds were never weighed and that
each grower's seeds were mingled with all other seeds. Although each grower could collect only a pro rata share of the
"overage," the company's records, with the aid of mere
mathematical computations, enabled the pro rata shares to be
ascertained.
The most difficult aspect of the Fanucchi decision involved
the problem of individual defenses. It was alleged, for example, that certain growers would not be entitled to collect,
since they had known and had consented to the method by
which they had been paid for their seed. The court simply
decided that such defenses could be handled individually when
each grower attempted to collect for his alleged losses. At first
glance this decision seems to put Fanucchi in a category with
Weaver, in which a final, complete determination could not be
made against the defendant. However, from the allegations of
the complaint it was clear that in Fanucchi the total amount
of the defendant's potential liability to all of the owners could
be established. The only necessary determination was that
defendant owed the plaintiff class a certain amount of money;
a later determination would divide the money among the members of the plaintiffs' class. Each member would have to come
in and prove his interest in the same way that creditors must
come in and prove their rights to funds set aside for creditors.
The actual prayer for relief in Fanucchi was that the defendants be declared constructive trustees of all the "overage" and
that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the cottonseed
or its reasonable value and then to distribute the same among
the growers according to their interests. This remedy enabled
the court to make a final determination in favor of the class
as a whole, against the defendants.
The Daar case bears marked similarities to Fanucchi. In
one sense, Daar is less difficult since there would be no individual defenses with regard to the amount of overcharge
made by the taxi drivers (assuming, as was alleged, that such
overcharges could be ascertained by the company). But
Daar is more difficult than most other cases in which a class
action is upheld, since in Daar there was no way to identify
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/10
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the individual members of the class. Unlike the growers in
Fanucchi who appeared on the records of the books, not all
the taxi users in Daar appeared on the records.
As already noted, however, Daar took the position that individual members of the class do not have to be ascertained.
Although the situation in Daar renders administration of the
second phase of litigation-the proving of claims by individuals-extremely difficult, this obstacle should in no way
detract from the validity of the class action. It is not as
hard for an individual to prove his claims in a proceeding
to determine what portion of a fund he is entitled to collect
as it is for him to bring an individual suit against the Yellow
Cab Company for a few dollars. Many plaintiffs would simply
forego suit; among those who did sue there would be much
duplication of effort (cost of filing, and the like) and, because of the inability of each individual plaintiff to gather
the proper evidence to prove his case, inconsistent decisions.
In the final analysis, the Daar case is justified simply on the
basis that an overall decision of liability could be made in the
class suit against the defendant for a specific sum of money.
The uncertainties of ultimate liability that existed in the
Weaver case were not present.
There are two important factors in Daar still to be discussed.
The court did not clearly articulate the nature of a valid class
action in terms of the nature of the relief sought and available. There is too much uncertainty in the law today leading
to too many costly and unnecessary appeals. Perhaps most
desirable would be legislation to replace the inaqequate and
misleading class action provision of section 382 and to adopt a
provision similar to the new Federal Rule 23, which was
promulgated after a long study of the class action problem.
The court in Daar cited the new Federal Rule 23 and noted
that it is in substantial agreement with the court's views on
class actions. The purpose of the rule was to list those
factors which the federal courts may weigh in determining
whether or not a class action is appropriate. Thus a class
action is permitted when:
CAL LAW 1969
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The court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) The interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate action; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
The court in Daar seemed to be applying this weighing standard when it noted that the action would not be brought if it
had to be brought by each individual separately for the pittance
he would be entitled to collect, and when it also noted that
common questions predominated over any individual questions which might arise.
Unfortunately, the reference in Daar to Federal Rule 23
is somewhat confusing. It is not clear if the court wished to
go so far as to permit class actions in cases where the criteria
of Rule 23 would be met even when no class judgment could
be had against the defendant for a given amount, or a given
relief, as was possible in such cases as Chance, Fanucchi, and
Daar itself.
In a subsequent case, Slakey Brothers Sacramento, Inc. v.
Parker 15 the court of appeal refused to permit a class action
by persons who were suing in fraud for individual damages
even though the fraud was similar if not identical with respect
to each of them. The court said, "[W]hether the Federal
Rule would demand judicial acceptance of the present class
action is problematical. California criteria demonstrate propriety of the trial court's rejection."16 The allegation in
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Slakey was that defendants by misrepresenting their financial

standing defrauded plaintiffs into forebearing to sue for collection of certain outstanding claims. The court relied primarily on the notion that each individual plaintiff would have
to prove what misrepresentations were made to him, what he
relied upon, and what his damages were. The court admitted
that there were common issues of law and fact, including
alleged identical misrepresentations which were addressed to
each member of the group sought to be represented collectively.
One can see then that the criteria of Federal Rule 23 might
have been satisfied despite the necessity of individual recovery
by each member of the class.
Certainly the California Supreme Court, if not the legislature, will have to clear up the ambiguities-not only those
caused by Daar's reference to the Federal Rule, but also those
which have existed for a long time because of the profusion
of uncertain decisions.
The Daar case raises one other interesting point. It falls
within the scope of the prior cases only because plaintiffs
alleged that defendant knew or could determine the amount
of overcharge that was made over the past four years. The
court took the position that it had to accept this allegation
as true. Defendant, on the other hand, asked the court to
take judicial notice of the cab company's charging policies,
which included an initial premium rate, a mileage rate, a
waiting time rate, and other factors-all making the exact
amount of overcharge impossible to ascertain. The court
rejected judicial notice as inappropriate. Nevertheless, this
problem raises this question: May the objecting parties now
proceed to raise the impropriety of a class suit in their pleadings and request a hearing under section 597 of the Code of
Civil Procedure l7 , 18 so that the disputed issues of fact on this
17,18. CCP § 597 provides: "When
the answer . . . sets up any other
defense not involving the merits of the
plaintiff's cause of action but constituting a bar or ground of abatement to the
prosecution thereof, the court may,
upon motion of either party, proceed
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to the trial of such special defense or
defenses before the trial of any other
issue in the case, and if the decision of
the court, or the verdict of the jury
upon any special defense so tried . . .
is in favor of the defendant pleading
the same, judgment for such defendant
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matter will be determined before any trial on the merits? If
so, the class action, it would seem, is still subject to attack.
All that has been accomplished is to get it past the demurrer
stage.
Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute

In Sylvestre v. King Manufacturing Co.19 a cleaning product
of the defendant exploded, injuring the plaintiff who was
working with it. In anticipation of bringing suit, plaintiff
in August, 1961, had written to the defendant company at its
Michigan office, but had received no reply. Upon inquiry, the
California Secretary of State informed plaintiff that a California corporation by the name of King Manufacturing Company had been suspended for failure to pay taxes. Plaintiff
erroneously assumed that this was the same corporation that
had allegedly caused his injuries. Therefore, plaintiff brought
suit in a California superior court. Although the action was
filed on November 24, 1961, not until May, 1964, did plaintiff discover that the proper defendant, King Company, located in Michigan, was in fact not a corporation but a single
proprietorship, had no agents for service of process in California and had no direct contacts with the state that would
bring it within the jurisdiction of the California Courts. By
the time plaintiff moved for service by publication on the owner
of the company, more than three years had elapsed from the
date the complaint was filed. Upon the defendant's motion
the court dismissed the action under section 581a of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The court of appeal reversed.
Section 581 a requires that an action be dismissed by the
court unless summons is served upon the defendant within
three years after the commencement of the action. The
section, however, exempts from its operation failure to serve
any defendant due to "his absence from the state, or while
shall thereupon be entered and no trial
of other issues in the action shall be
had unless such judgment shall be reversed on appeal or otherwise set aside
or vacated . . ."
216
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he has secreted himself within the state to prevent the service
of summons on him."20 The issue in Sylvestre was whether
this exception refers to a non-resident who has never been in
the state of California or covers only residents of the state
who have left for a period of time. The Code Commissioner's
note to section 581 a indicates that the purpose of the exception
is to cover circumstances where a defendant leaves the state to
avoid being served. This purpose, of course, excludes a defendant who has never been in the state.
The court held, however, that the exceptions in the act apply
to individuals who have never been residents of the state. It
relied heavily on the effect of section 417, which permits a
personal judgment to be rendered against persons outside the
state on service by publication if the person was either a
resident of the state at the time of the commencement of the
20. CCP § 581a. When action to be
dismissed: lack of prosecution: exception.
No action heretofore or hereafter
commenced shall be further prosecuted,
and no further proceedings shall be had
therein, and all actions heretofore or
hereafter commenced must be dismissed
by the court in which the same shall
have been commenced, on its own motion, or on the motion of any party interested therein, whether named in the
complaint as a party or not, unless summons shall have issued within one year,
and all such actions must be in like
manner dismissed, unless the summons
shall be served and return thereon made
within three years after the commencement of said action, except where the
parties have filed a stipulation in writing that the time may be extended. But
all such actions may be prosecuted, if
general appearance has been made by
the defendant or defendants, within said
three years in the same manner as if
summons had been issued and served;
provided, that, except in actions to partition or to recover possession of, or to
enforce a lien upon, or to determine
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conflicting claims to. real or personal
property. no dismissal shall be had under this section as to any defendant
because of the failure to serve summons
on him during his absence from the
State, or while he has secreted himself
within the State to prevent the service
of summons on him.
All actions, heretofore or hereafter
commenced, must be dismissed by the
court in which the same may be pending. on its own motion, or on the motion of any party interested therein, if
summons has been served, and no answer has been filed, if plaintiff fails, or
has failed, to have judgment entered
within three years after service of summons, except where the parties have
filed a stipulation in writing that the
time may be extended.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to the
provisions of this section shall not. nor
shall any extension of time to plead
after such motion. constitute a general
appearance. (Added Cal. Stats. 1907,
ch. 376, p. 712. 2. As amended Cal.
Stats. 1933. ch. 744. p. 1869. § 89; Cal.
Stats. 1949, ch. 463. p. 810.
I: Cal.
Stats. 1955. ch. 1452. p. 2640. § 5.1
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action, at the time the cause of the action arose, or at the
time of service. The court said that if section 581 a applies
only to one-time residents, the exceptions in section 581 a
would not be necessary; for section 417 permits service whenever the individual has been a resident and has left the jurisdiction. Section 581a and its exceptions can apply only to
non-residents who cannot be served under section 417. The
court's analysis is weak since one may pose a case where the
statutes would not overlap. If the defendant in this case was
not a resident at the time the cause of action arose, subsequently became a resident of the state, and then left the state
immediately after discovering an action would soon be brought
against him, he would not be subject to section 417. He
was a resident neither at the time of commencement nor at
the time the cause of action arose. Presumably then, section
581a could apply. However, one need not resort to this kind
of reasoning to attack the court's reliance on section 417.
Looking at the problem realistically, the legislature probably did not consider whether or not section 581 a should
apply to those who have never been residents. This is, particularly evident since section 417 was first enacted in 1951,
long after section 581 a. The purpose of 417 is to give
California personal jurisdiction over defendants outside its
borders; the purpose of 581 a is to require plaintiffs to press
their actions so that they do not remain dormant, clogging
calendars and causing unnecessary confusion. Section 581 a
assumes that if plaintiff will only take the appropriate steps,
proper jurisdiction over defendant can be obtained.
The court in Sylvestre supported its position further by
stating that it is unfair to force a plaintiff to seek service by
publication in order to satisfy the time limitations of section
581 a when he cannot obtain jurisdiction over the defendant or
any of his property. The court's assumption that had such
worthless publication been made, the requirements of section
581a would have been satisfied, is surprising. Since the
policy of 581 a is to keep courts free from stale actions, it is
more reasonable to hold that the statute requires not only
timely service, but also effective service by which jurisdiction
218
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is obtained. The reason for allowing a case to remain pending
is not greater when jurisdiction is unobtainable for three years
than when it is obtainable but plaintiff fails to take action.
As the court itself noted, if section 581a need not be met,
a plaintiff, when suing an out-of-state defendant, need only
file his action before the statute of limitations has run and then
wait until such time as defendant might venture into the state
so that valid jurisdiction could be obtained; no limitation whatsoever is applicable. The court aptly pointed out that if such
jurisdiction is ever obtained, perhaps many years later, a
defense might be difficult, if not impossible, to prove. But
the court failed to pursue this point, thus avoiding discussion
of the full impact of its decision on subsequent cases. Instead, it noted that the defendants in this particular case had
actually been notified and could have come in to make a defense. As far as the court was concerned, the notification
took the sting out of the notion that the service of process
might ultimately be made so late as to injure the defendant's
presentation of her case. The court cited Carmichael v. Superior Court l as direct authority for its holding. In that case
the defendant sought dismissal on the grounds not only that
section 581 a 2 applied, but also that the plaintiff had not
brought the action to trial within five years as required by
section 583. The motion to dismiss was denied and defendant brought his case to the court of appeal. It was admitted
that the defendant had been out of the state before and since
the commencement of the action. The court read the cases
under section 583 as not requiring dismissal after five years
if special circumstances interrupted the running of the period.
It further held that such circumstances exist whenever it is
impractical to bring the case to trial, even though defendant
1. 55 Cal. App.2d 406, 130 P.2d 725
(1942).
2. The pertinent portions of CCP
"Any action heretofore
or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the same
shall have been commenced or to which
it may be transferred on motion of the
§ 583 provide:

defendant, after due notice to plaintiff
or by the court upon its own motion,
unless such action is brought to trial
within five years after the plaintiff has
filed his action . . . except where
it be shown that the defendant has been
absent from the State . . "
CAL LAW 1969
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has not been guilty of acts tending to obstruct the administration of justice. In Carmichael, as in Sylvestre, defendant
continually resided outside the state, so there was no way to
obtain jurisdiction over him. The court in Carmichael, in a
single paragraph, rejected the contention that the action should
be dismissed under section 581 a; it merely stated that the
section provides that no dismissal shall be had for failure to
serve summons on a defendant during his absence from the
state-presumably holding that the statute was clear on its
face. s
The court in Sylvestre also cited cases interpreting section
351, which provides that a statute of limitations does not run
against a person while he is out of the state. 4 In one case
cited, Cvecich v. Giardino,5 the court held that the statute
applies even though the defendant had never been in the
state at all. The defendant in Cvecich argued that this interpretation would even allow an out-of-state plaintiff to sue
an out-of-state defendant in California at any time. In reply,
the court noted that section 351 would not apply in such a
situation. Instead, the case would be subject to section 361,
which provides that the statute of limitations of the state
where the cause of action arose applies to any action "except
in favor of one who has been a citizen of this State, and who
has held the cause of action from the time it accrued."6 It is
important to note that there is no comparable limitation regarding service of process under section 581 a. Thus, under
3. 55 Cal. App.2d at 409, 130 P.2d
at 726.
4. CCP Ii 351. Exception, where defendant is out of the state. If, when
the cause of action accrues against a
person. he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term
herein limited, after his return to the
state, and if. after the cause of action
accrues, he departs from the state, the
time of his absence is not part of the
time limited for the commencement of
the action.

6. Tn Bayuk v. Edson, 236 Cal. App.
2d 309 at 318, 46 Cal. Rptr. 49 at 55
(1965), the court held that the statute
of limitations did not begin to run on
two out-of-state architects who agreed
to design and supervise the building of
a house in California while they were
out-of-state. The statute began to run,
said the court, only after they stipulated
to jurisdiction over them. The fact that
no service could be made was held to
be sufficient reason for the statute not
to fun.

5. 37 Cal. App.2d 394, 99 P.2d 573
(1940).
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Sylvestre even an out-of-state plaintiff may sue an out-of-state
defendant in California, and as long as he files the action
within the prescribed period of limitations, he may leave his
action pending until such time as he is able to obtain jurisdiction-a time distant in the future or perhaps never.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Sylvestre is that it
relied on the California Supreme Court decision of Wyoming
Pacific Oil Co. v. Preston. 7 Wyoming Pacific held that the
seeming mandatory provisions of 58 I a were subject to some
judicial discretion and reversed an order of dismissal. The
court drew a parallel between section 58 I a and section 583
and then asserted that in the so-called mandatory dismissal
provisions of 583, judicial discretion did exist for permitting
the action to be continued under special circumstances.
The plaintiff in Wyoming Pacific had filed an action against
several defendants in December, 1952. One defendant was
served in February, 1955. About two weeks before the three
year period for service and return of summons expired "feverish attempts were made" to serve defendant Bush. Plaintiff
was unsuccessful until shortly after the three year period had
run. Bush filed a motion to quash summons and a motion to
dismiss supported by an affidavit showing that he was accessible at his home and office prior to the time plaintiff began his
"feverish attempts." In denying the motions the supreme court
seemed to eliminate any requirement that a plaintiff be diligent throughout the three year period. s
The Wyoming Pacific case is adversely criticized in 6
U.C.L.A. Law Review 476 (1959) on the ground that the
decision subverted the purpose of 581 a: to require prompt
service, preventing the cumulation of stale claims and the
crowding of court calendars. 9 At least, it is noted, 581 a
7. 50 Cal. 2d 736, 329 P.2d 489
(1958).
8. The Wyoming case was discussed
in Hill v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. App.
2d 746, 59 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1967) in
which the court of appeal took the position that the discretion there should be
special and that the Wyoming Pacific

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

case should be limited to its facts. However, in the Hill case, the clear distinction that was made was between a case
of impossibility or high impracticability
of service and a case where service
was possible but not carried out.
9. As was pointed out by the author,
the court has discretionary power to
CAL LAW 1969
221

31

Civil Procedure
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 10

should never be subject to discretion when the out-of-state
defendant is subject to jurisdiction under section 417.10 When
prosecution of a case is possible, it is unconscionable to allow
a plaintiff to delay indefinitely such prosecution until defendant may have difficulty in presenting his case. l l
By relying on Wyoming Pacific, Sylvestre becomes part of
a pattern in the courts eliminating the mandatory rules which
require dismissal because of the failure or inability of an attorney to carry forward a case. Not long after Sylvestre was
decided the California Supreme Court itself in Weeks v.
Roherts 12 so construed the five-year dismissal provision in section 583 in order to permit a stale claim to be continued in
the courts by expanding the special circumstances in which
judicial discretion could be exercised. In Weeks the plaintiff
failed to have his case tried before the five year period had
elapsed. As the five year limit neared plaintiff prevailed on
one trial judge to set a trial date some twenty-eight days ahead,
just within the five year period. Defendant by a motion to
the judge in charge of the master calendar obtained an order
vacating that trial date, apparently on the ground that there
was insufficient time to prepare. As a result, no new date
could be set prior to the running of the period, and plaintiff's
case was dismissed under 583. The supreme court reversed
the dismissal on the ground it constituted an abuse of discretion. The majority thought twenty-eight days was a reasonable time in which to provide facilities for a trial and that the
order of the master calendar judge was therefore improper. 13
The weakness in all these cases is the unwillingness of the
appellate court to press for needed procedural regularity when
dismiss a case for lack of prosecution
even before the three year period under
§ 581 a has elapsed. This is clear from
§ 583 which permits a court to dismiss
anytime after two years from the commencement of the action.
10, 11. See 6 UCLA Law Review at
480.

12. 68 Cal.2d 802, 69 Cal. Rptr. 305,
442 P .2d 361 (1968).
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ground that ~ 583 did not allow the discretionary determination, but on the
ground that the master calendar, particularly in Los Angeles County, where
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to control and that it must be within the
discretion of the calendar judge to determine just when cases can and cannot
be brought to trial.
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to do so may cut off the rights of individual plaintiffs. The
reason is not so much that the courts disapprove of the mandatory provisions as that they fear unfairness may result. Unfortunately, the decisions rarely delve deeply enough into
the problem to see undesirable long range consequences. The
facts of Sylvestre provide a perfect example. Before plaintiff
could attempt to serve process he necessarily had to file his
action. Once he had filed he suddenly learned that he could
not obtain jurisdiction over defendant. He was not able to
proceed with the action and yet was subject to dismissal under
581a if he did not. Apparently, he faced a dilemma that
could be resolved only if the court held as it did. But surely,
plaintiff had a reasonable alternative: He could have filed
suit in defendant's home state and voluntarily dismissed the
California proceeding.
The underlying assumption of the Sylvestre d~cision is that
a plaintiff should always be encouraged to file suit in his
home state regardless of what is the nature of the action,
where it arose or where defendant is located. But this assumption is contrary to the basic policy of the constitutional
and statutory laws governing personal jurisdiction. If it is
desirable to bring suits against out-of-state defendants, a
proper long-arm statute should be enacted, as has been done
by many states. When constitutional, the defendants may then
be brought before the court promptly; the cases may be prosecuted with dispatch; service of summons need not be delayed;
and any resultant difficulties to plaintiff, defendant or the
court may be avoided. There is no reason then not to apply
section 581 a firmly. If the case is one in which the California courts do not have constitutional power to take jurisdiction over the ctefendant or one in which the legislature
consciously determines that such jurisdiction should not be
exercised, surely, the action should not be permitted to remain
pending indefinitely in California courts.
Multiple Cost Bills for Testimony of an Expert Witness
May each of a number of prevailing co-parties in an action
obtain as part of his costs the full statutory witness fee and
CAL LAW 1969
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travel costs for an expert witness who testified on behalf of
each of such co-parties? He may, according to City of Downey v. Gonzales. 14 Suit was brought by the City to condemn
15 parcels of property to make way for a municipal hospital.
Only 13 separate claims were stated because some of the
parcels were owned by the same persons, and claims for these
parcels were lumped together. There were a total of 28 defendants since most of the parcels were owned by more than
one individual.
At the close of the case, each of the 28 defendants filed
a bill for costs with appropriate supporting data, and each
claimed the statutory per diem witness fee of $4 plus travel
costs, amounting to a total of $9 per day, for an expert appraiser who had been hired jointly by all of the defendants
to testify on their behalf. The aggregate amount claimed for
the eight days the expert attended trial was $2,016. The trial
court allowed the defendants, in the aggregate, to collect but
one fee plus mileage for each of the seven days the expert
was summoned to testify, that is $63. 16
On appeal the decision was reversed. The court held, two
to one, that defendants were entitled to collect for each of the
13 separate claims a per diem fee plus mileage for each of the
eight days the witness attended the trial. Justice Stephens,
writing for the majority, reasoned that since the action involved 13 different cases, which plaintiff elected to consolidate
rather than bring separately, the prevailing parties on each
claim should be able to collect costs as if they had been sued
separately. The court pointed out that, although the trial
judge has discretion to tax costs in eminent domain as in
other cases, the state constitutional provision requiring the
payment of just compensation for condemnation required payment to condemnees of their costs "necessarily incidental to
the trial of the issues.,,16 The requisite necessity, according to
14. 262 Cal. App.2d 563. 69 Cal.
Rptr. 34 (1968).
15. The witness was only subpoenaed
for the first seven days of the trial. On
the eighth day he appeared and testified
voluntarily. The appellate court held
224
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fees for all eight days.
16. City and County of San Francisco v. Collins, 98 Cal. 259 at 262, 33
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the court, was conclusively established because plaintiff City
had not challenged defendants' verified cost bills which constituted prima facie evidence that all items therein claimed
had been necessarily incurred. 17
Although it would seem obvious, once the witness was
present in court to testify for anyone defendant, there was
no need for other defendants to incur any expenses to obtain
his testimony, the court simply held that by calling any witness to testify on his behalf, every party obliges himself to
pay that witness the statutory fees.
The court's analysis is not persuasive. The technical argument that defendants' unchallenged cost bills must be accepted
as establishing the necessity of the claimed expenses, regardless of the facts on the record, seems woefully weak. Surely,
the trial court was entitled to take judicial notice of the
number of times the expert witness actually traveled to court
and the number of days he attended. IS
The court of appeal itself did not give full credence to
all the unchallenged cost memoranda and refused to permit
recovery by all 28 defendants. Instead, it allowed persons
who were co-owners of a single property to obtain costs only
once among themselves. Even a person who owned two
separate properties was permitted but one recovery for costS.19
The court made these distinctions on the basis of an 1855
case, Rice v. Leonard,20 which had held in a one page opinion,
giving no specific facts whatever, that the successful co-defendants were not entitled to separate awards for costs but
could only recover such costs jointly. Why the Rice decision
was not read simply as proscribing multiple recovery by all
the successful co-defendants in Gonzales is unclear!
17. Judge Aiso, who wrote a separate
concurring opinion, placed heavy emphasis on this point.
18. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 451, 452.
19. 262 Cal. App.2d at 567, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 38. This determination seems
inconsistent with the court's idea that
separate claims entitle defendants to
separate fees. The expert witness was
15
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required to testify separately as to the
value of the different parcels and separate actions would have been appropriate whether or not the owners of the
different parcels were the same or different people.
20. 5 Cal. 61 (1855).
1. In Branhart v. Kron, 88 Cal. 447,
26 P. 210 (1891), a question arose
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tablish from the facts the necessity for having obligated himself
to pay the costs. 2 Such showing will depend on whether or
not the majority was correct in stating that each defendant who
called the expert witness to testify obligated himself to pay
the witness both mileage and per diem fees even though the
witness was already in court. The court cited only Government Code section 68097, which provides that a witness may
demand his mileage and per diem fees one day in advance and
that the court shall not compel him to testify until this
allowance is paid. But section 68097 in no way implies that
once the witness is in court he is entitled to a duplicate fee
from every litigant for whom he testifies.
There are a number of older cases in other jurisdictions
upon which the court might have relied. These decisions were
made when courts generally thought that a witness attended
court solely for the benefit of the party or parties for whom
he was called to testify. For example, in Pearce v. Person,s
it was held that when both the plaintiff and defendant summoned a witness, he was entitled to collect his witness fee
from both of them.4
The argument of Judge Kaus who dissented in Gonzales is
based on the assumption that a witness comes into court not
simply for the benefit of parties for whom he testifies, but
for the entire community. Thus the statutory fee is not a
personal obligation of every litigant for whom the witness
testifies, but a community obligation to every knowledgeable
witness who comes to court. This is true even though the
law normally requires the obligation to be discharged by one
whether one defendant could obtain
costs for a witness whose primary testimony had been on behalf of a co-defendant; the court, in allowing the costs,
clearly implied that the only party who
could collect was the one who had in
fact incurred the expense.
2. Kramer v. Ferguson, 230 Cal.
App.2d 237, 250, 41 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68
(1964); Jeffers v. Screen Extras Guild,
226

Inc., 134 Cal. App.2d 622, 286 P.2d 30
(1955).
3. 5 N.C. 188 (1857).
4. See also House v. Barber, 10 Vt.
158 (1838); O'Kane v. People, 46 III.
App. 225 (1892). But the courts were
far from unanimous. See e.g. Renfro
v. Kelly, 10 Ala. 338 (1846), holding
contrary to Pearce v. Person.
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or more of the parties (usually those who are unsuccessful).
Strong support for this position appears in Wigmore on Evidence, branding as false any "impression that the witness' duty
runs to the parties and not to the community and that he is
rendering his services for money to the party that desires
them".5
The few modern cases on this problem generally reject
multiple recovery.6 The most recent decision, and one of the
clearest, is Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide. 7 Three successful plaintiffs, whose actions had been consolidated for trial,
each sought to collect fees for the witnesses who had testified
on their behalf. The court held that to allow triple witness
fees would conflict with the policy of Federal Rule 42 (a),
which permits the consolidation of claims in part "to avoid
unnecessary costs." Surely it follows, if multiple fees are
not to be permitted when the court consolidates actions originally brought as separate lawsuits, they should not be allowed
when plaintiff consolidates the actions at the outset.
Logicalty, it makes little sense to argue that a witness should
be entitled to collect 13 per diem fees each day simply because the case happens to involve 13 sets of defendants.
Similarly, it would be ridiculous to allow a witness to collect
13 times for travel when he made but one trip. As Justice
Kaus said, "At the very least, he should be forced to form a car
pool with himself".8
The majority decision in Gonzales can be understood only
in light of the fact that it dealt not with an ordinary witness
in an ordinary case, but with an expert appraiser in a condemnation proceeding. There is little doubt that each property owner must, as a practical matter, employ an expert
appraiser to testify on his behalf and that an expert appraiser
5. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2201 (2)
(iii) at page 135 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
6. Vilsack v. General Commercial
Securities Corp., 106 Fla. 296, 143 So.
250 (1932); Barnhart v. Jones, 9 F.R.D.
423 (S.D.W. Va. [1949]); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321,

335 (9th Cir. [1958]), cert. den. 358
U.S. 840, 3 L.Ed.2d 76, 79 S. Ct. 66.
7. 258 F.2d 321, 335 (9th Cir.
[1958]), cert. den. 358 U.S. 840, 3
L.Ed.2d 76, 79 S.C!. 66.
8. 262 Cal. App.2d at 573, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 42.
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charges a substantial fee for preparing himself to testify and
for taking the stand. Nevertheless, California law takes the
position that no matter who the witness is or how much he
charges the party who calls him, all a party can collect in
costs is the statutory per diem fee of $4 plus mileage. This
is the rule generally applicable under section 733 of the Evidence Code. It has been applied consistently in condemnation
cases. 9
The majority decision circumvents this rule, but in so doing
sets a precedent which is bound to cause confusion and may
ultimately lead to serious injustice. For example, an honest
but unsuccessful or partially successful litigant who sues
multiple defendants in a single action may find himself charged
with multiple travel and per diem fees for a large number
of ordinary eyewitnesses each of whom testified for the defendants. Presumably, each witness may demand the full
amount of the fees even though this amount constitutes a substantial windfall.
The court in the present case might have provided defendants with the desired relief by deciding that the current cost
provisions are unconstitutional when applied in condemnation
actions. Apparently the point was not raised at the trial
level. But a substantial argument can be made that "just
compensation" requires payment for the full cost of an expert
appraiser whenever his testimony is reasonably necessary.
Most of the cases in point, and there are not many, are collected in an annotation in 18 A.L.R. 2d 1229-30 (1951).
Although some courts in other jurisdictions have held that
their state constitutions require such payment, the California
courts have not. 10 In one of the most recent cases, the Supreme
Court of Arizona relied on California decisions to reject a
demand for such costs.l1
9. City of Los Angeles v. Vickers, 81
Cal. App. 737, 254 P. 687 (1927); County of Los Angeles v. Marblehead Land
Co., 95 Cal. App. 799, 273 P. 138
(1928); People v. Bowman, 173 Cal.
App.2d 416, 343 P.2d 267 (1959); Frustuck v. Fairfax, 230 Cal. App.2d 412,
228
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10. See footnote 9, supra, for authorities.

11. State v. MacDonald, 88 Ariz. 1,
352 P.2d 343 (1960).
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In light of the Gonzales decision and the general confusion
over cost policy, it seems appropriate for the State Bar to
undertake a detailed study of the problem with an eye toward
a new, clearly stated, unified cost statute to guide courts and
lawyers in future litigation.
Cause of Action-The Scope

A court's definition of the scope of a cause of action for
res judicata and other purposes depends upon which of two
basic conflicting theories it accepts. The so-called "operative
facts" theory defines a cause of action in terms of the defendant's acts. All injuries suffered by a plaintiff due to a single
transaction or occurrence or a related series of transactions
or occurrences are held to fall within a single cause. If a defendant negligently drives his automobile into plaintiff's house,
causing him personal injury, as well as damage to personal
and real property, plaintiff has but a single cause of action
and must claim all of his damages at once.
The so-called "primary right" theory defines a cause of
action in terms of the nature of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. A plaintiff has a separate cause of action for an invasion
of each of his "primary" rights, even if such invasions are
caused by a single act or series of acts by defendant. There
are separate primary rights for physical injury to person,
injury to personalty, damage to realty, injury to character,
etc. In the situation above where defendant negligently drives
his vehicle into plaintiff's house, plaintiff has at least three
separate causes of action which he could pursue separately in
three cases.
California courts have uniformly and consistently followed
the primary right theory for over one hundred years. 12 It is
somewhat startling, therefore, to find the court in Holmes v.
12. See Comment, Res Judicata in ing § 761 (1961); Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24
California, 40 Cal. L. Rev. 412 at 419 Cal.2d 891, 151 P.2d 846 (1944); Mc(1952); 2 Witkin, Calif. Proc., Plead- Nulty v. Copp, 125 Cal. App.2d 697,
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David H. Bricker, Inc. 13 holding that plaintiff was barred by res
judicata from maintaining a suit for damage to his car because he had previously instituted a personal injury action
based on the same facts of liability, against the same defendant.14 The case is significant for three reasons: (1) it raises
the question of whether California courts should adopt a new
cause of action theory; (2) until confirmed or overruled by
the supreme court or the legislature, the decision will cause
considerable confusion and may prove to be a trap for unwary
litigants; (3) for a case having such far reaching ramifications,
the low quality of the opinion and the underlying research
upon which it is based, are matters of serious concern.
The relative values of the "operative facts" and "primary
rights" theories have been hotly debated and discussed in many
articles and cases. 15 The advantage of the operative facts
theory is its tendency to cut down litigation by requiring all
relevant facts to be tried in a single action for the convenience
of the court, parties, and witnesses. This apparent advantage
is lessened somewhat by the fact that under the primary right
theory the principles of collateral estoppel limit the efficacy
of bringing separate actions based upon a single set of facts.
And there may be a decided advantage in allowing separate
suits in certain types of cases. For example, when a plaintiff
who has been seriously injured in an automobile collision must
wait for nearly two years before obtaining a trial by jury,
there seems little reason why he should not be permitted to
bring a separate action in small claims court to recover immediately for the damages to his automobile. Although small
claims actions do have res judicata effect to bar future suits
on the same cause of action, they do not have collateral estoppel effect; thus, under the primary right theory the per13. 265 A.C.A. 695, 71 Cal. Rptr.
562 (1968) hearing granted ~ovember
7, 1968.

14. The personal injury action previously filed had no collateral estoppel
effect since the issues were never litigated.
230
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(1948); 2 Witkin, Calif. Proc., Pleading
§ 11, pp. 984-86 (1954).
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sonal injury suit could in no way be affected by the small
claims court decision .16
Perhaps the deciding factor should be whether or not operation of the law under the primary right theory has caused
sufficient difficulty to justify the confusion and uncertainty
that would surely result from a switch to the operative facts
theory. There is a strong argument that even if such a change
is justified, the legislature, and not the courts, should make
it. Then the new law would take effect prospectively only,
and unsuspecting plaintiffs, such as the one before the court in
Holmes, would not suddenly find themselves barred by past
actions.
If the Holmes case properly declares the law, unwary individuals who, for one reason or another, filed and collected
in separate actions for property damages, will lose their rights
to later recover for serious personal injuries. This seems an
intolerable price to pay for the advantages of the new rule.
Even assuming that the advantages of a change in the law
justify court action, such an important decision should be made
only in an opinion which clearly notes the significance of the
change and which affords it maximum pUblicity. Moreover,
the court should carefully research the case and discuss all the
relevant authority with precision so that the scope and impact
of the case will not be misinterpreted. Unfortunately, the
opinion in Holmes falls far short of these goals. Reliance was
placed primarily on a 1957 annotation in American Law Reports17 which merely states that the majority rule in the United
States is that there is but one cause of action for personal injury and property damage arising from the same tortious act.
California cases are cited to support both the majority and the
converse minority rule, although the most recent cases are
claimed to support the majority position.
The court in Holmes failed to discuss the historical distinction between the operative facts and primary right theories
of a cause of action. Had it done so, it would have found
that the A.L.R. annotation clearly rniscited the so-called
16. Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal.
17. 62 A.L.R.2d at 977.
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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"majority" cases. In each of these cases, Kidd v. Hillman,ts
and Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Winfield/ 9 as well as in
a third case cited by the court as giving additional support,
Pacific Indemnity Group v. Dunton,20 plaintiffs in an original
suit had sought damages for personal injuries and damages to
personal property. In the second suit brought by plaintiff's
insurer as subrogee, the claim was again for damages to personal property, but the items of personalty involved were different from those involved in the first action. In two of these
cases, Kidd and Dunton, the court held that the rules of res
judicata prohibited maintenance of the second action since
the first suit had already been brought for both personal injury and property damage. In the third case, Winfield, it was
held that the defense of res judicata had been waived. 1
By asking for damages due to injury to their personal property, plaintiffs in each of the above actions shut off the right
to claim damages to personalty in the later suits. When
a defendant's act causes damage to several items of personal
property, it is clear that a plaintiff has but one cause of action
regarding the primary right as to his personalty no matter what
kind of items are involved. 2 He cannot sue separately with
respect to each separate item damaged, any more than a
plaintiff should be permitted to sue separately for each separate bruise he received in a single accident. The holdings in
these cases are clearly correct, but they can in no way support
the court's proposition that had plaintiffs sought only personal
injury damages in the first actions, they would have been
barred in the second suits from pursuing remedies for property damage.
In addition to misreading those cases alleged to support its
decisions, the court in Holmes failed to deal with those authori18. 14 Cal. App.2d 507, 58 P.2d 662
(1936).
19. 24 Cal. App.2d 477, 75 P.2d 525
(1938).
20. 243 Cal. App.2d 504, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 332 (1966).
1. It should be noted that the court
232
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in Holmes, at page 699, miscited both
the holding and the rationale of the
Winfield decision.
2. See Sanderson v. Niemann, 17
Cal.2d at 572, 110 P.2d at 1029, discussing the Kidd case; cf. Beronio v.
Southern Pacific R.R., 86 Cal. 415, 24
P. 1093 (1890).
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ties taking a contrary position. 3 For example, the court
made no mention whatsoever of the history of section 427
of the Code of Civil Procedure or the relevant cases under it,
despite the fact that they constitute the most direct authority
on the point in question. 4 Prior to 1907, section 427 prohihited a plaintiff from joining a claim for personal injury with
a claim for damage to property. Thus in Lamh v. Harhaugh,5
in which defendant allegedly broke into plaintiff's home causing injuries to character, to health and to property, the court
specifically held that each of the listed injuries involved a
separate cause of action which could not be claimed in a
single lawsuit.
In a 1912 decision, Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R.,6
which is closely analogous to Holmes, plaintiff was permitted
to collect for personal injuries from an auto accident in spite
of a prior action in which he had sued for and collected
damages to his automobile. The court rejected the argument
that plaintiff had split a single cause of action, pointing out
that under section 427 plaintiff was not even permitted to
join claims for the two types of injury. The court in Schermerhorn failed to note or comment upon a 1907 amendment
to section 427, which on its face permitted a plaintiff to join
all causes of action arising from a single transaction or
occurrence. Perhaps in response to the uncertainty caused
by the apparent conflict between the statute and the statement
in the case, the legislature in 1915 again amended section
427 specifically providing that "causes of action for injuries
to person and injuries to property, growing out of the same
tort, may be joined in the same complaint." (Emphasis
added.) There seems little doubt, at least from a historical
point of view, that both the legislature and the courts have
taken the position that injuries to person and property constitute separate causes of action under California law which
mayor may not be joined at plaintiff's option.
3. The court confined itself to refuting several of plaintiff's citations which,
as the court quite correctly analyzed,
were generally irrelevant.
4. § 427 of Cal. Code of Civ. Proc.
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is the section entitled, "Joinder of
causes of action."
5. 105 Cal. 680, 39 P. 56 (1895).
6. 18 Cal. App. 454, 123 P. 351
(1912).
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The court in Holmes, as its final point, contended that even
if one finds that injury to person and property constitute two
separate causes of action, a failure to join both types of relief
in a single action will result in a res judicata disposition. The
court argued that such a position is justified by the strong
policy against piecemeal litigation and cited the compulsory
counterclaim provision, section 439, as authority for its position. The weakness of this argument is readily apparent upon
consideration of section 442, the California cross-complaint
statute. Any action of defendant against plaintiff arising
out of the same transaction as plaintiff's action qualifies as
a cross-complaint under section 442. But unless such a
claim also meets the requirements of the counterclaim statute,
section 438, the compulsory provisions of section 439 do not
apply. Had the legislature intended that all actions arising
from a single transaction be brought in a single lawsuit, it
certainly would have extended section 439 to cover all crosscomplaints by defendants against plaintiffs. Surely, section
439 in its present form cannot be read to imply the drastic
change in the law for which it is cited in the Holmes decision.
It can only be hoped that in the near future an authoritative,
well reasoned decision will clarify the confusion, uncertainty,
and potential harm of the Holmes case.

Collateral Estoppel-Effect of Settlement Before Trial
The decision of the court in Artucovich v. Arizmendiz7
raises an important question as to the propriety of affording
collateral estoppel effect to issues in an action which is settled
by the litigants prior to trial. Plaintiff, Juan Artucovich,
sought damages for personal injuries received when the car
he was driving collided with another vehicle owned by defendant, Michael Arizmendiz and driven by the defendant's wife
Cecilia, who was alleged to have been negligent.
Defendant successfully moved for a summary judgment on
the basis of the disposition of a prior personal injury action
brought by Cecilia against Artucovich, involving the same
7. 256 Cal. App.2d 130, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 8[0 (1967).
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collision, in which it had been alleged that Artucovich was
negligent. Before trial this first action had been dismissed
with prejudice by plaintiff Cecilia after a settlement agreement
under which Artucovich paid her $500.
Two arguments were successfully advanced on appeal in
the second case in support of the summary judgment below.
First, it was asserted that plaintiff, by failing to counterclaim
for his injuries against Cecilia in the first action, had lost his
right to claim such damages in any later action, and, second,
it was claimed that the dismissal of the first suit necessarily
determined that Cecilia was not negligent. Since Michael
Arizmendiz's liability was based solely on a statuteS making
an owner liable for the negligence of a permittee driver, a
finding that Cecilia was not negligent would completely exonerate her husband.
The argument that plaintiff's failure to counterclaim in the
first action barred his present suit cannot be supported. It
is true that under section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
a defendant who fails to file against a plaintiff a counterclaim
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim will be barred from later instituting that claim as
an independent action. But the court failed to recognize
that section 439 applies only to counterclaims and not to crosscomplaints. Under section 438 a counterclaim is defined as
an action by a defendant against a plaintiff. A counterclaim
cannot be brought against a third party. Thus, the only way
Artucovich could have sued Michael Arizmendiz in the first
action was by way of cross-complaint under section 442.
There is no provision for a compulsory cross-complaint.
The second ground for upholding the summary judgment
is equally insubstantial. The court of appeals, which stated
that the first suit "adjudicated" the fact that Artucovich was
not negligent, made a totally unwarranted assumption that a
dismissal based upon a compromise is tantamount to a factual
determination which can be given collateral estoppel effect.
It is manifestly against the policy of California law to permit
8. Cal. Vehicle Code § 17150.
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the use of settlements or settlement negotiations against a
party except with respect to an action upon the settlement
itself. One example of this policy is contained in section 997,
which provides a method whereby a defendant may make a
formal offer to compromise a plaintiff's claim. A 1967
amendment makes clear that a judgment based upon acceptance of such an offer cannot be used for subsequent litigation. 9
If a formal settlement under the code cannot result in a judgment having collateral estoppel effect, surely an ordinary compromise agreement leading to a dismissal should not have such
effect. The policy is further supported by a provision of the
Evidence Code, which specifically makes a compromise in
one case inadmissible in evidence in other litigation. to
There are two basic reasons underlying the policy against
giving collateral estoppel effect to compromise judgments. l l
First, as a general matter, out-of-court settlements are strongly
favored. If a judgment based on a compromise gives rise
to possible unforeseen effects detrimental to the parties, such
settlements will be discouraged. The danger of such unforeseen effects has already substantially increased because of recent decisions which have extended collateral estoppel principles to cover persons not parties to the action. U Second,
it is unjustifiable to assume that payment by one party in a
settlement of a claim constitutes an admission, let alone an
"adjudication," of issues constituting liability. A defendant
may agree to pay a small sum merely because it would cost
much more to fight the suit to a successful conclusion. In
auto cases insurance companies are often in complete charge
of the defense. Within the monetary limits of a policy, a
company has virtual autonomy in deciding on a settlement on
behalf of the defendant whom it has insured. Rarely does
the company have any direct interest in any later action which
its insured might himself wish to bring.
9. See Witkin, California Proc. 1967
Suppl., Judgment § 66A.

pel effect to compromise judgments, see
108 U.Pa.L.Rev. 173 (1959).

10. Cal. Evid. Code § 1152.
ll. For a general discussion of the
reasons against giving collateral estop236
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Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the present case is
that it follows on the heels of another recent case which made
a similar decision. Although the court in the present case
failed to cite it, the opinion in Louie Queriolo Trucking Inc. v.
Superior Coud 3 is closely analagous. In that action plaintiff
vehicle owner was permitted to recover for the damages to his
vehicle on the basis of facts "established" in a prior suit
brought by the driver of the vehicle against the same defendant. The case received considerable attention for allowing
a plaintiff to use recovery by another person in a prior suit
"offensively" to establish his own right to recover. 14 One
important aspect of this case has received no special mention,
however. In the first suit, after the driver had won a jury
verdict and while defendant's appeal was pending, the parties
agreed to a compromise. The appellate court in the second
action assumed without comment that the settlement must have
been in favor of the driver who won below and that it established the truth of his claims. It was on the basis of these
assumptions that the plaintiff in the second suit was allowed
to prevail. The case is somewhat distinguishable from the
present case in that there had been a jury decision, but this
difference was substantially weakened because the opinion
clearly treats the jury decision as having been nullified by the
decision to compromise.
The decisions in Artucovich and Louie Queriolo Trucking
Inc. should be disapproved as soon as possible, before they
begin an undesirable trend in the law. At the same time, it
should be made clear that if a litigant wants a compromise
decision to have effect beyond the present action, he may
accomplish this by including appropriate provisions in the
settlement agreement.
Proper protection for all parties could have resulted if
Michael Arizmendiz had been made a party to the settlement
agreement between his wife and plaintiff. Without such protection, a driver in Cecilia's position often could lose the
13. 252 Cal. App.2d 194, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 389 (1967).
14. For a further discussion of this
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value of her settlement, for if a plaintiff is successful against
a car owner, in many cases the owner can in turn sue the
driver for indemnity.
Availability of Appeal in Small Claims Court

Section 117j of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that a defendant may appeal from a small claims court judgment. The appeal is to the superior court and results in a
trial de novo in that court. In Skaff v. Small Claims Court for
the Los Angeles Judicial District/ 5 the California Supreme
Court faced the question whether or not section 117j
applies to a plaintiff with respect to a counterclaim filed
against him in his small claims action.
Plaintiff in Skaff brought suit to collect $250, the amount
of a deposit made on a rented automobile. Defendant counterclaimed for $175 which was allegedly due from the plaintiff
on an entirely different transaction. The court held for defendant on both the claim and counterclaim. The plaintiff
attempted to appeal the judgment on the counterclaim to the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which refused to hear
the case. The supreme court held that the plaintiff should
be treated as a defendant with regard to the counterclaim and
was thus entitled to appeal.
The court had to base its holding solely on considerations
of policy since it recognized that the language of section 117 j
itself is ambiguous. The opinion listed four reasons for
the decision. First, "[s]ince decisions of this court characterize a counterclaim as a separate, simultaneous action, the
plaintiff in the original action becomes a defendant in the
cross-action and acquires the appellate remedies of a defendant.,,16 The court supported this statement merely by citing
two otherwise unrelated cases, ostensibly for the proposition
that, regardless of context, any cross-action should necessarily
be treated as separate and distinct from the original claim. 17
15. 68 Cal.2d 76, 65 Cal. Rptr. 65,
435 P.2d 825 (1968).
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Neither of the two cases in any way supports such a broad
proposition. ls Obviously, such a broad view is unjustified.
One must look to the underlying nature and purpose of the
matter in question to determine the extent to which such
separate treatment makes sense.
The second ground of the court's decision was that the
under1ying reasons supporting the denial of an appeal to a
plaintiff in his original action do not apply to a counterclaim.
The court pointed out that for his own claim plaintiff could
have chosen to go either to municipal or small claims court,
and that by electing the latter, with its inexpensive, informal
procedure, he voluntarily agreed to be bound by the decision
without further recourse. On the other hand, the court argued
that with respect to the counterclaim plaintiff was not voluntarily in small claims court but was there involuntarily, just
as if he were a defendant; thus he should not be held to have
waived any of the rights to which a defendant is entitled.
The court's second argument is also weak, for it ignores
the basic purpose of permitting defendants to demand a de
novo tria1. The small claims procedure is a highly desirable
method of solving minor disputes, and no ordinary type of
appeal is warranted. Given the size of the disputes involved,
Court, 219 Cal. 179, 25 P.2d 983, 90
A.L.R. 384 (1933); Case v. Kadota Fig
Ass'n., 35 Cal.2d 596, 220 P.2d 912
(1950).

with a purported cross-complaint which
had been brought by an association, the
defendant in the original claim. At
that time an unincorporated association
was unable to sue in its own name;
18. The court's citation of cases is
since a cross-complaint was treated as
subject to severe criticism. The first
a separate action, it was held that no
case, Pacific Finance Corp. v. Superior
cross-complaint could be brought. HowCourt, 219 Cal. 179, 25 P.2d 983, 90
ever, and this the court in Skaff overA.L.R. 384 (1933), involved a crosslooked, the Kadota Fig case went on to
complaint as opposed to a counterclaim.
While a cross-complaint has always hold that the defendant's claim would
qualify as a counterclaim and as such
been treated as a separate action by the
could be maintained. The court could
California courts, a counterclaim has
have cited Tomales Bay Oyster Corp.
generally been treated as a defense to
v. Superior Court, 35 Ca1.2d 389, 217
the plaintiff's action and not separate at
P.2d 968 (1950), which held for the purall. This principle is dramatically ilpose there involved, again totally irrelelustrated by the second case cited in the
vant to the present case, that a counterSkaff opinion, Case v. Kadota Fig
Published
by GGU596,
Law Digital
Commons,
claim should be considered as a separate
Ass'n.,
35 Ca1.2d
220 P.2d
912 1969
(1950). Here the court was involved
action.
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the costs of such appeals to the litigants and to the court
is too great a price to pay. But since a defendant in small
claims court is denied his rights to counsel and trial by jury,
the entire small claims procedure is unconstitutional unless
defendant has the power to request a de novo trial where those
rights can be exercised. However, there is no justification
for extending such reasoning to a plaintiff who has voluntarily entered small claims court under a statute which provides that a counterclaim may be filed against him. Once he
selects the small claims forum, it is not unreasonable to say
that by so doing he agrees to accept its decision on any valid
counterclaim against him as well as his own claim. This is
particularly so because to be tried in small claims court, the
counterclaim must itself fall within the court's jurisdictional
limitations. 19 Since plaintiff waived his constitutional rights
to counsel and trial by jury by entering small claims court,
he should not be given the right to demand a trial de novo.
The third reason for the court's decision was that denial of
an appeal by plaintiff for the counterclaim would tend to discourage the use of the small claims court. The court said,
"Non appealability of the counterclaim would expose the moving party to the possibility of the conversion of his claim into
a quite unexpected adverse judgment which he could neither
discharge, because he lacks the funds, nor challenge on appeal."~o This argument ignores the realities of small claims
litigation. A poor plaintiff, already in court, would probably
rather have defendant's counterclaim brought against him in
small claims court than face the possibility of a separate action
in a municipal court at another time. Also, to a poor plaintiff,
the right to a trial de novo is hardly attractive. Such a trial
is held in superior court, where the normal rules of evidence
apply; witnesses must be formally called and cross-examined;
a full range of trial and post-trial motions are available; and
a jury may be demanded. Representation by counsel is a
practical necessity. Yet the $15 statutory amount which a
winning litigant is permitted to recover for counsel fees hardly
19. Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 117h.
240

20. 68 Cal.2d at 79, 65 Cal. Rptr. at
68, 435 P.2d at 827.
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suffices to cover his actual outlay.l From a practical point of
view it seems most unlikely that the Skaff decision will encourage poor plaintiffs, heretofore reluctant to press their cases,
to file in small claims courts. The number of situations would
seem few indeed where persons have decided to forego suit
altogether or to select a municipal court, merely because a
counterclaim might be filed against them-and might be lost
under circumstances where an appeal might prove worthwhile.
On the other hand, the Skaff decision will tend to strengthen
the hand of the wealthy, powerful litigant who utilizes the
small claims court against poor defendants. An affluent plaintiff will welcome a counterclaim by such a defendant; for it
will provide him the additional advantage of threatening an
expensive and lengthy trial de novo in order to obtain a
favorable settlement on the entire case.
In a note on the California small claims court in 52 Cal.
Law Review 876 (1964), the authors did an empirical study
of some 386 cases in the Oakland-Piedmont-Emeryville Judicial District. Their study revealed that most plaintiffs in
small claims courts are businesses and governmental agencies; they filed some 60% of the cases. Of the remaining
cases, mostly filed by individuals, undoubtedly a significant
portion were brought by landlords against their tenants. On
the other hand, only 15 % of defendants in small claims courts
are not individuals. The result of the current case will tend
to discourage individual defendants from bringing counterclaims in those cases where it would be most desirable for
them to do so. For example, when a business brings suit
on a conditional sales contract, defendant buyer will now
hesitate before counterclaiming for a defect in the goods
purchased. He will know that even if he is successful, the
plaintiff will be likely to demand a de novo trial. In many
cases a business will utilize counsel already on retainer so
the added cost to it will be infinitesimal, whereas defendant
may have neither money, time, nor energy to safeguard his
rights.
The court's fourth reason for its decision is that the recogni-
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tion of plaintiff's right of appeal on a counterclaim avoids
a ruling which would pivot that right upon the fortuity of
the way in which the claim is presented. In other words, if
the defendant had brought his claim as a separate action,
plaintiff could appeal; thus, the court reasons, plaintiff should
be allowed to appeal when defendant's claim is asserted in a
counterclaim. In taking this position the court once again
ignores the substantial advantages of the small claims procedure and the underlying justifications for allowing defendant
an appeal. The de novo trial on appeal is a time-consuming
and wasteful maneuver, requiring a superior court judge to
sit on a matter of trivial moment; it should be permitted only
when the constitution so demands.
One other issue worthy of discussion was touched upon
by the court. The court seemed to assume that if a claim
and counterclaim are not treated as entirely separate for purposes of appeal, then defendant might not be treated as a
plaintiff with regard to his own counterclaim. This means
that defendant presumably would be allowed to appeal from
an adverse decision on the counterclaim as well as from the
decision on the claim. Obviously this is not a sound result.
If a defendant files a counterclaim he should be bound by the
result just as if he were the plaintiff. Thus, section 117j
should be read within the policy and meaning of the statute
as follows: when a party brings an action affirmatively,
whether by claim or by counterclaim, he should be treated
as a plaintiff and barred from appealing an adverse decision
on any aspect of the case. Having subjected himself to the
tribunal voluntarily, he should be required to abide by the
decision of that tribunal without appeal. As already stated,
the appeal provided in section 117j should be applied only
to prevent the small claims procedure from being an unconstitutional restriction on defendants in cases where only a
claim is filed. The above rule cannot be applied, however,
where defendant's counterclaim is compulsory under section
439. 2 Section 117h states that the normal counterclaim
2. In the only case dealing with the
point, Thompson v. Chew Quan, 167
242
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rules apply in small claims court when the counterclaims fall
within small claims jurisdiction. This would seem to mean
that, as to such counterclaims, the provisions of section 439
are applicable. If the party bringing such a counterclaim
does not approve of the small claims court decision on it, it
seems clear that he must be free to appeal to the superior
court and obtain a trial de novo. Otherwise, denial to him
of an attorney and a right to trial by jury would be unconstitutional. His bringing a compulsory counterclaim can in no
way be considered a waiver. It makes little sense, of course,
to make counterclaims mandatory in small claims court. Since
defendant may always obtain a trial de novo on such a counterclaim, he might as well have the option, at the outset,
where to file the action. If, under the small claims statute,
it were to be made clear that a counterclaim is not compulsory
and thus need not be filed, a defendant who did voluntarily
file in small claims court could then be held to have waived his
right to appeal.
In the light of the Skaff decision and the general compulsory counterclaim problem in the small claims court, it would
be wise for the legislature, once again, to revise the small
claims court provisions. It should do so simply by stating
that any party who seeks affirmative relief by way of either
claim or counterclaim waives his right to appeal, and accepts
the decision as final on both claims and counterclaims. The
compulsory counterclaim statute should be deemed inapplicable.
court held that a counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the
small claims court was not compulsory
under § 439 even though arising out of
the same action as the original claim.
It left open the question whether any
counterclaim was mandatory, although
indicating that some are by virtue of
§ 117h.
An argument can be made that the
general language of § 117h should not

be read to encompass compulsory
counterclaims. The Supreme Court of
California in Sanderson v. Niemann, 17
Cal.2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941), held
that the rules of collateral estoppel do
not apply to the decisions of small
claims courts because of that court's
special character. Similar reasoning
may also be used to support the inapplicability of § 439 of the Cal. Code of
Civ. Pro.

*
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